
















We  extend  the  pioneering  work  of  Aumann  and  Serrano  by  presenting  an  index  of  inherent 
riskiness of a gamble having the desirable properties of their index, while being applicable to gambles with 
either positive or negative expectations.  As such, our index provides a measure of riskiness which is of use 
for  both  risk  lovers  and  risk  aversive  gamblers,  and  is  defined  for  all  discrete  and  a  large  class  of 
continuous gambles. We analyze abstract properties of our index, and present in addition three empirical 






What is Inherent Risk? It is the riskiness of a gamble defined independently of either the 
utility or the wealth of the individual contemplating taking the gamble. In other words, the index 
is unconcerned with the attitude of the individual towards risk, but attempts to capture that risk 
which is inherent to the gamble itself. The first such index has been presented by Aumann and 
Serrano (2007)
2 (hereafter [AS]), but it is restricted to gambles which a risk -averse agent would 
accept. Thus, while it is an index of inherent risk, it is restricted in its applicability to a particular 
type of  agent and does not even cater to a risk -averse investor who wishes to sprinkle his 
portfolio with some potentially high return, high risk gambles. For [AS], risk aversion applies to 
every component of the portfolio and is not an "on average" notion.  Further, a gamble with a 
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negative expectation need not be of relevance only for risk lovers. Thus, if a speculator buys a 
quantity cacao futures with negative expectations, her behavior is clearly risk-loving. And yet, 
were a large chocolate company to buy the identical gamble for hedging purposes, this would be 
a risk-reducing measure! In light of the current world-wide financial meltdown, it is difficult to 
entertain seriously the assumption that risk-loving behavior is restricted to those on the fringes of 
financial markets such as casino goers, casual horse bettors and compulsive gamblers.  
However, the [AS] index has two features which should be true of any index of risk and 
yet which are surprisingly hard to find among other measure of risk. First is what [AS] term the 
Duality Axiom: As they put it, "Duality says that if the more risk-averse of two agents accepts the 
riskier of two gambles, then a fortiori the less risk-averse agent accepts the less risky gamble." 
The second characteristic is monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance; "in 
particular,  if  gamble  g  is  sure  to  yield  no  more  than  another  gamble  h,  and  with  positive 
probability actually yields less, then g should be riskier than h. 
It should be noted that the prevalent definition of risk in finance does not possess these 
properties. According to a recent statement, it runs "Risk, in a financial sense, is defined as 
variance about some forecasted value."
3 As [AS] note, all measures of risk based on dispersion 
alone fail with respect to the monotonicity property. "Thus if g and g + c are gambles, and c is a 
positive constant, then (variance as a measure of risk will) rate g + c precisely as risky as g, in 
spite of the fact that it is sure to yield more than g." 
Other measures of risk have been introduced but these often depend upon the wealth of 
the investor and are almost invariably restricted to risk averse agents. From the psychological 
literature, [AS] note surveys of families of indexes by Brachinger (2002) and Brachinger and 
Weber  (1997).  The  papers  surveyed  include  Coombs  (1969),  Pollatsek  and  Tversky  (1970), 
Fishburn (1977, 1982 and 1984), Luce (1980), Sarin (1987), Luce and Weber (1988), and Jia, 
Dyer and Butler (1999). In the economic literature, Foster and Hart (2008a and 2008b) present a 
measure of riskiness based upon the wealth of the investor and defined for risk averse agents 
only.  
In this paper, we build upon the pioneering contribution of [AS] by presenting an index 
which has the desirable properties of their index while being applicable to all discrete and a large 
class of continuous gambles. Thus, the index is able to rank gambles ranging from gold kept 
under  the  bed  in  a  guarded  bomb  shelter  to  buying  a  lottery  ticket  and  is  thus  of  potential 
relevance to all individuals regardless of attitude towards risk or area of investment interest. We 
                                        




also provide some simple empirical applications of our index, thereby moving beyond the self-
confessed strictly "in principle" approach of [AS]. 
We proceed as follows. In section 1, we provide a formal extension of the Aumann and 
Serrano index of riskiness to include the case of risk-loving agents. We do so by introducing the 
risk-loving equivalent to the constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA) utility function, the constant 
absolute risk-loving (CARL) function. We use both functions (which are really different forms of 
the same function) to define an index of inherent risk, which takes on values defined on the 
positive real line. A gamble which would be acceptable to a risk-averse agent has a value less 
than one, while risk-lovers might also accept gambles for which the value of the index is greater 
than one. When the expected return to the gamble is zero, the index takes on a value of one. Our 
index is analyzed in section 2, where further properties for the simple case of a binary gamble are 
developed and some empirically testable hypotheses are derived. These hypotheses are tested in 
section 3, where three simple applications of our index are presented. The first is the example of 
roulette, where anecdotal evidence is used to support the hypothesis that, for a given (negative) 
expected return, higher odds roulette bets are less inherently risky than those at lower odds. In the 
second example, data from the horse betting market at the Happy Valley track in Hong Kong are 
used, first to estimate winning probabilities for the horses and thereby to calculate the index of 
inherent risk for each horse. Given that this is a pari-mutuel market, it may be surprising to find 
that nearly one third of all horses represent bets with a priori net positive expected returns. We 
use the index to show that risk averse bettors, who bet only when expectations are positive, are 
inclined to bet on favorites rather than longshots, while risk lovers prefer to bet on longshots. Our 
final example is taken from the US equity options market. Here we show how difficult it is even 
to  construct  a  gamble,  let  alone  measure  its  riskiness!  We  need  to  estimate  probabilities  of 
outcomes as well as the outcomes themselves. This is done for a large sample of options traded 
on financial stocks between 2005 and 2007. Using a very simple example of a set of plausible 
gambles  thus  constructed,  we  show  that  the  riskiness  index  moves,  on  average,  in  the  same 
direction as the traditional measure of risk, the variance of the constructed gamble.  
 
 






4, we introduce and discuss the notion of a generalized index of inherent 
riskiness, with no a priori assumptions about attitudes toward risk. A utility function is a strictly 
monotonic  twice  continuously  differentiable  function  u  defined  over  the  entire  line.  We 
normalize u so that  
  (0)=0 and (0)=1 uu    (1) 
     
 If u is concave then an agent with a utility function u is risk averse, while if u is convex, then 
an agent with a utility function u is risk lover. 
The following definition is due to Arrow (1965 and 1971) and Pratt (1964):  
 
Definition 1.1 The coefficient of absolute risk of an agent i  with utility function  i u  and 
wealth w  is given by:  
  ) ( )/ ( = ) , ( = ) ( w u w u u w w i i i i i        
 
 Note  ) (x ui  is concave in a neighborhood of  w if and only if  0, > ) (w i   while if it is 
convex if and only if  0. < ) (w i   
Along the lines of [AS, Lemma 2,3] we show : 
 
Lemma 1.2  Let agents i  and  j  have normalized utility functions  i u  and  j u  and 
Arrow-Pratt coefficients  i   and  j   of absolute risk aversion. Then    
    1.  For each  0, >   suppose that  ) ( > ) ( w w j i    at each w  with  . |< |  w  Then 
) ( < ) ( w u w u j i  whenever  . |< | 0  w    
    2.  If  ) ( ) ( w w j i     for all  , w  then  ) ( ) ( w u w u j i   for all  . w    
 Proof. 1. Let  . |< |  y  If  0 > y . Then by (1),  




i i i ) ( )/ ( = ) ) ( ln ( = (0) ln ) ( ln = ) ( ln
0 0
            
 
00 = ( ) < ( ) = ln ( )
yy
i j j z dz z dz u y      
 If  0 < y   then  the  inequality  is  reversed  by  the  same  arguments.  Thus ,  ) ( ln ) ( ln
>
< y u y u j i    
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< y  so also  ) ( ) (
>
< y u y u j i    whenever  0.
>
< y  So if  0 > w  then by (1)  
  ) ( = ) ( < ) ( = ) (




i      
and similarly by using the reverse signs, when  0. < w   
2. In parallel to the first part, with i  and  j  interchanged, strict inequalities are replaced 
by weak inequalities and the restriction to   |< |w  is eliminated.     QED 
 
Let agent i  have utility function  , i u  and let  w  be a real number. We say that i  accepts 
g  at  w  if  ), ( > ) ( w u g w Eu i i   where  E  stands for ``expectation'', otherwise,  i  rejects  g  at 
. w   We show:  
 
Proposition 1.3  Let agents i  and  j  have normalized utility functions  i u  and  j u  and 
Arrow-Pratt coefficients  i   and  j   of absolute risk aversion. If  ) ( > ) ( j j i i w w    then there is 
a gamble  g  that  j  accepts at  j w  and i  rejects at  . i w   
  
Proof. Without loss of generality assume  0, = = j i w w  so  (0). > (0) j i    Since  i u  and 
j u  are twice continuously differentiable it follows that there is a  0 >   so that  ) ( > ) ( w w j i    
for all  . |< |  w  Moreover, for   small enough  i u  and  j u  are each either concave or convex in 
the interval  ). , (     It follows from Def.1.1 that if  j u  is concave then  0 > ) ( > ) ( w w j i    and 
so  i u  is concave as well, and if  i u  is convex so is  . j u  Now, by Lemma 1.2.1,  
   
  ( ) < ( ) whenever 0 | |< ij u w u w w     (2) 
   
 (I) Assume first that  j u  is concave. Choose   with  /2. 0      For     x 0  and  , , = j i k  set  






:= ) (      x u x u x f k k k  
By (2),  
  ( ) < ( ) forall  ij f x f x x  (3) 
By (3), concavity of  j u , and (1),   
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  0. = (0) < (0) < (0) j j i u f f  
On the other hand, by monotonicity of the utilities,  






= ) ( i i i u u f    
Since  i f  is continuous, it follows that  0 = ) (y fi  for some   < < 0 y  and so by (3),  0. > ) (y f j  
So if  0 >   is sufficiently small then  0 >   y  and  
  ) ( < 0 < ) (     y f y f j i  
Let  g  be the half-half gamble yielding       y  or      y  Then  
  ) ( = ) ( < 0 < ) ( = ) ( g Eu y f y f g Eu j j i i      
Hence  j  accepts  g  at 0 while i  rejects it. 
(II) Now assume that  i u  is convex. For  , , = j i k  define  k u ~  by  
  ) ( = ) ( ~ x u x u k k    
Then  
(0) = 0, ' ( ) = ( ) > 0, ' (0) =1 and   " ( ) = ( ). k k k k u u x u x u u x u x           
Moreover, by (2),  
   |< | 0 whenever ) ( ~ < ) ( ~ w w u w u i j   
Since  i u ~  is concave in the interval  ), , (     we are in the same situation as in (I), with i  and  j  
interchanged, thus there is a gamble  g  so that  
  ) ( ~ < 0 < ) ( ~ g u E g u E i j  
Take the gamble  , g   then  
  ) ( = ) ( ~ < 0 < ) ( ~ = ) ( g Eu g u E g u E g Eu j j i i      
Hence  j  accepts  g   at 0  while i  rejects it. 
(III) Finally assume  i u  is concave and  j u  is convex. This case is the simplest. Let  g  be 
the half-half gamble yielding     or  . Then  
  ) ( < 0 < ) ( g Eu g Eu j i  
Thus i  rejects  g  and  j  accepts it. 
For arbitrary  i w and j w , define  ) (x ui  by  ) (
*
i i w x u   and  ) ( = ) (
*
j j j w x u x u   and apply 
the following to 
*
i u  and 
*




Definition 1.4  Call i  at least risk averse or no more risk loving than  j  (written  j i ) if 
for all levels  i w  and  j w  of wealth,  j  accepts at  j w  any gamble that i  accepts at  . i w  Call i  
more risk averse or less risk loving than  j  (written  ) j i  if  j i  and  . i j
5  
 
As a corollary of Prop.1.3 we have:  
 
Corollary 1.5  Given agents i  and  , j  then  
  ( ) ( ) i i j j i j w w     
for all  i w  and  . j w   
  
Proof.  Assume  ij    and  assume  there  are  i w   and  j w   with  ). ( < ) ( j j i i w w     By 
Prop.1.3, there is a gamble  g  that i  accepts and  j  rejects, a contradiction. So  ) ( ) ( j j i i w w     
for all  . , j i w w  
Assume now  ) ( ) ( j j i i w w     for all  . , j i w w  We wish to show that for all  i w  and  j w  
and any gamble  , g  if  i  accepts  g  at  i w  then  j  accepts  g  at  . j w  Without loss of generality 
assume  0. = = j i w w  Then Lemma 1.2.2 with i  and  j  interchanged implies  ) ( ) ( w u w u i j   for 
all  . w  Hence  ) ( ) ( g Eu g Eu i j   for all  g  implying the desired result.  QED 
 
Definition 1.6  An agent is said to have Constant Absolute Risk (CAR) utility function if 



















 If  0 >   then the agent is risk-averse with a CARA utility function, while if  0 <   then 
the  agent is  risk-loving  with  a  CARL - Constant  Absolute  Risk-Loving - utility  function  .  If 
0 =   then the agent is risk neutral. The notion of ``CAR'' is justified since for any  ,   the 
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 Note that in [AS] the above is defined for risk averse agents only, and is denoted by ``i  is at least as risk averse as  j ''.  
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coefficient of absolute risk    defined in Def.1.1, satisfies    = ) (w  for  all  , w  that is, the 
Arrow-Pratt  coefficient  is  a  constant  that  does  not  depend  on  . w   We  have  thus  a  sheaf  of 
functions   u  satisfying for all x:  
  ( )is continuous at =0. ux    
                      To see this, we need to show that for all  0 , ( ) = , lim x u x x     where we consider 
the two sided limit. Now, if  0 = x  then for all  , ( )= u x x    and if  0  x  then  
  x xe e














                    Given any  ,   observe that  
  ( ) = ( ) Eu g Eu g      (4) 
  Indeed, assume  g  results in  } , { 1 n x x   with respective probabilities  . , 1 n p p   Then  
  ) ( = ) (1 ) ( = ) ( = ) (
1 g Eu e p x u p g Eu i x
i i i    

    

    
                  The CARA version of following proposition is proved in [AS, Prop.4.1]. We state 
here the general case.  
 
Proposition 1.7  An agent i  has CAR utility function if and only if for any gamble  g  and 
any two wealth levels, i  either accepts  g  at both wealth levels, or rejects  g  at both wealth 
levels.   
Proof. Any CAR utility function   u  accepts  g  if and only if  , >
) ( w w g e Ee
       that is 
if and only if  1 >
g Ee
   which is independent of  . w Conversely, assume an agent  i  so that 
) ( < ) ( * * w w i i    for wealth levels  . , * w w  If  0 > ) ( > ) ( * w w i i    then we can follow the proof at 
[AS]. The proof there is based on the formula 
0 ( ) lim( ( ) 1/ 2)/ w p w   
   where  () pw  is that p 
for which  i  is  indifferent  at  w between taking and  not  taking  the  gamble yielding  ±ʴ with 
probabilities  p  and  1−p  respectively.  (This  formula  can  be  found  in  e.g.  Aumann  and  Kurz 
(1977), Section 6). It is then used to construct another gamble which is rejected by  i at  w but 
accepted at  *. w  
 If 0 ) (  w i  , then as in 1.3, define  ). ( = ) ( ~ x u x u i i    Then  ) , ~ ( w ui i   is positive and we 
have a gamble  g  accepted at one level and rejected at the other for  . ~
i u  Replacing  g  by  g   
concludes the proof for this case.  
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If  ) ( < 0 < ) ( * w w i i    then for   small enough a half-half gamble resulting     will 
be accepted at  * w  and rejected at  . w   QED 
 
The next theorem verifies the existence of the general index for the following class of 
gambles. A gamble g is gameable if it results in possible losses and possible gains. If g has a 
continuous distribution function, then it is gameable if it is bounded from above and below, that 
is, its distribution function is truncated.     
 
Theorem 1.8  Let  g be a  gameable gamble. Then there exists a unique number  ,   so 
that, for any wealth, a person with utility function   u  is indifferent between taking and not taking 
. g  In other words, the CAR utility function   u  satisfies for all  , x   
  ). ( = ) ( x u x g Eu     
Moreover,   is positive (negative) if and only if Eg  is positive (resp. negative),  
  
Proof. Define a map  ) ( f  by  
  ( ) =1
g f Ee
 
    (5) 
Since g is gameable it follows first that  () f   is defined for all  ,   and then, since it results 









   
 
Now, 
  ( ) (0)=0 ( ) (0)= ( ) ( )<0 i f ii f Eg iii f      
By  (iii) f is  concave,  hence  has  at  most  two  roots,  one  of  which  is  zero.  If  0 > Eg   then  f 
increases at 0, hence the second root   is positive. If  0 < Eg  then f decreases at 0, hence the 
second root is negative. If  0 = Eg  then  0 =   is the only root. 
To show the last part note that if  0    we have by definition  
  0 = ) (1 = ) (
1 g Ee g Eu

 
    
It follows that for all  , x   
    ) ( = ) (1 = 1 = ) (
1 ) ( 1 x u Ee e Ee g x Eu




          
Also  if  0, =    then  by  the  proof  above  necessarily  0 = Eg   and  so  0 = = ) ( 0 Eg g Eu   and 




Remark  As pointed out by Schulze (2008), [hereafter Sc], for an unbounded distribution 
function  u(x), the map  () f  is not necessarily defined for all  . (In [Sc, Ex 3] it is defined for 
0 =   only).  In this case we cannot apply the proof of Th. 1.8. In [Sc] it is shown that 
g Ee
   is 
the Laplace transform of u(x). Since we consider both positive and negative values of  , we use 
the two-sided Laplace transform. Thus  () f  is defined for all real   in the region of 
convergence of u(x). If this region of convergence is wide enough, then the proof is still 
applicable. The question, which distributions admit the appropriate range of convergence, is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
Definition 1.9  Given a gamble  , g  denote the number   obtained in Th.1.8 by the 
upper limit of taking  . g   
 Note that if we replace  g  by  Ng  then the upper limit of  Ng  is the corresponding root 
of (5) where  g  is replaced by  , Ng  and thus equals  .
1
 N  
 
Remark 1.10  Given a gamble  g  where  0, > Eg  let its upper limit   be as in Def.1.9. 
Then 
1    is the index of riskiness of  g  as defined in [AS].  
 
The notation upper limit is justified by the following corollary.  
 
Corollary 1.11 Let   be the upper limit of taking a gamble  . g  Then: 
1. If  0 > Eg  then all CARL accept  g  and a CARA person with a utility function   u  
accepts  g  if and only if  
    < < 0  
   2. If  0 < Eg  then all CARA reject  g  and a CARL person with a utility function   u  
accepts  g  if and only if  
  0 < <   
3. If  0 = ) (g E  the all CARA people reject  g  while all CARL people accept  . g  
 
Proof. 1. Assume  0 > Eg  and let  . < < 0    Note that for all  , = ( , ) w w u   and 
) , ( =    u w  as defined in Def.1.1. By Lemma 1.2.2,    <  implies  ) ( > ) ( x u x u    for all  
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0. > x  Hence by definition of the upper limit  ,    
  0 = (0) = ) ( > ) (    u g Eu g Eu  
This implies that a CARA person with a utility function   u  accepts  . g  Similarly, if    >  then 
a  -CARA person will not accept  . g  
 2. If  0 < Eg  then by Th.1.8,  0, <   and for  0 < <   we have  . < < 0      Since 
0 > ) ( g E   this implies by (4) and part 1:  
  0 = ) ( = ) ( < ) ( = ) ( g Eu g Eu g Eu g Eu            
Hence  0 > ) (g Eu  and a CARL person with a utility function   u  accepts  . g   QED 
 
We propose here a general index of inherent riskiness. Given a gamble  g  and its upper 
limit  ,   define  ) (g Q  by  
  ( ) = Q g e
    (6) 
     
 It is straightforward to check the following properties: 
  
Corollary 1.12  The generalized index  ) (g Q  given in (6) satisfies: 
1.  0 > ) (g Q  for all  . g  
2.  If  0 > Eg   then  1 < ) (g Q   and  if  0 < Eg   then  1. > ) (g Q   When  0 = Eg   then 
1. = ) (g Q  
3.  . ) ( = ) (
1/N g Q Ng Q  In particular  
 
1 ) ( = ) (




Proof. 1. is clear. 2. follows directly from Th.1.8. 
3. By Remark 1.9, the upper limit of taking  Ng  is  ,
1
 N  where   is the upper limit of 
taking  . g  Hence by (7),  
 
N N g Q e Ng Q
1/ 1
) ( = = ) (






Remark 1.13 Unlike the case of the [AS]- index, homogeneity of degree 1 does not hold. 
However, when  0 > ) (g E  then it is replaced by (increasing) monotonicity. This follows since in 
this case  1. < ) (g Q  Hence if  1 < t  then  ), ( < )) ( ( = ) (
1/ g Q q Q tg Q
t  while if  1 > t  then 
). ( > )) ( (
1/ g Q q Q
t   
            If  0 < ) (g E  then  ( ) 1 Qg   and Q  is monotonically decreasing by the same 
argument as above, with the reverse inequalities. The intuition for this result will be 
demonstrated in Comment 3 after Application 3.1. 
 
We wish to show now that our index  ) (g Q  satisfies duality. Along the lines of [AS]:  
 
Theorem 1.14  Let  g  be a gamble and let i  and  j  be agents so that  . ij   If i  accepts 
g  at  i w  and  ) ( > ) ( h Q g Q  then  j  accepts h at  . j w   
  
Proof.  Without loss of generality, assume  0. = = j i w w  Let    be the upper limit of 
taking  g  and   the upper limit of taking  , h  as defined in Def.1.9. Thus  0. = ) ( = ) ( h Eu g Eu    
By assumption,  ) ( > ) ( h Q g Q  hence by (6),  
  >.    (7) 
  Set  ). ( sup = ), ( inf = w w j w j i w i      Since ij  ,  it follows from Cor.1.5 that  
  ij     (8) 
        
 
By Lemma 1.2.2,  
  ( ) ( ) and ( ) ( ) for all . ij ij u x u x u x u x x     (9) 
If  0 > ) (g Eui  then by (9), also  0, > ) (g Eu
i   hence by Cor.1.11 (part 1 or part 2),  
  < i    (10) 
Combining (7), (8) and (10) we have  . <  j  Hence again by Lemma 1.2.2,  
  ) ( ) ( < ) ( = 0 h Eu h Eu h Eu j j      
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Hence  j  accepts  . h  This concludes the proof of the theorem.  QED 
 
             The results above give a characterization of the inherent risk index. 
            
             Theorem  1.15  Any  index  satisfying  duality  and  properties  (1)-(3)  of  Cor.1.12  is  a 
positive power of the index defined in (6).  
         
            Proof.  Let Q’ be an index satisfying the hypothesis of the theorem. Then 
1 ' (ln ') RQ
   
satisfies duality, as an increasing function of Q’.  By Cor. 1.12.2, R’ is homogeneous of degree 1, 
hence, when considering gambles with positive mean, we have by uniqueness of the [AS]-index 
R, that R’=aR where a is a positive number. It follows that  
11 11
' ' ( ) . aa RR Q e e Q

    If g is a 




 Other properties of the general index of inherent risk follow almost directly from the 
corresponding properties stated and proved in [AS]. In what follows we list two of them. 
 
Corollary 1.16  1. [AS,5.3] The general index Q is first and second order monotonic. 
2. [AS, 5.4] The index  Q is (uniformly) continuous in the sense that  ) ( ) ( g Q g Q n   
whenever  g gn   uniformly.  
  
Proof.  1.  Assume  . > * g g   Consider  the  map  ) ( g f   defined  in  (2).  Then  for  all 
), ( > ) ( 0, >
*    g g f f   while  for  all  ). ( < ) ( 0, <
*    g g f f   If  0 < Eg   then  by  Th.1.8  the 
nonzero roots  * ,   of 
* , g g f f  respectively are negative and hence satisfy  . > *    It follows that 
). ( < ) ( * g Q g Q  If  0 > Eg  then   is positive and the proof is as in [AS]. 
 
2. The proof is as in [AS], moreover, the continuity of the general index is uniform since 




2  Analytical discussion 
 
In this section we discuss further properties of the index of inherent risk. We start with 
the binary case.  Let  g  be a gamble that results in a gain of  M  with probability  p  and a loss of 
L   with  probability  . 1 = p q    We  assume  M   and  L   are  positive  real  numbers.  Following 
Th.1.8 we need to solve  0. = ) (g Eu  That is:  
    ) (1 ) (1 = ) ( ) ( = 0
1 L M e q e p L qu M pu
 
       
   
              Set:                                         
  e x=  
Then we are looking for positive roots of the function:  
  ( ) = 1
ML f x px qx
    (11) 
 where  1 = x  is one root and the index of inherent risk  ) (g Q  is another root of that function.  
We discuss first some analytical properties of  ). (g Q  Assume  L=1 and consider the 
following special cases: 
: 1 = M  In  this  case  we  need  to solve  0, = q px  so  . / = p q x  When  0.5 = p  then 
0 = ) (g E  and  1. = ) (g Q  This agrees with the discussion in the proof of Th.1.8.  
              : 2 = M  We need to solve  0 =







 where  . / = p q t  Then  1 > x  if and only if  2, > t  that is  1/3 < p  and  0. < Eg  
When  1/3 = p  then  0 = ) (g E  and  1. = ) (g Q   
   M very large: In this case we solve the original equation  0. = 1  
M qx px  As 
  M  then  . 1/p x   
 
 In order to facilitate the empirical examples discussed in the next section, we summarize 
partial relations between expected utilities, expectations of gambles, chances to win and riskiness. 
We start with expected utilities:  
 
Proposition 2.1  Assume  g  results in a gain of M with probability  p  and a loss of L  
otherwise.  Consider  () Eu g   as a function of the independent variables L, M and Eg; then: 
        1. 
()






















   
 
 
Proof.  1.  Since  (1 )( ) ( ) Eg pM p L p M L L        , we have 







.                                                                                          (12) 
Hence 
11 ( ) (1 (1 ) ) (1 ( ) )
M L M L L Eg L
Eu g pe p e e e e
ML
    
 
    
       
       
(13) 
     
implying  
 
1 1 ( ) ()
= ( ) ( 1)
M L M Eu g
e L M e
Eg
  
    


   
 
If  0    then the last factor above is positive, while if  0    then it is negative, thus the 
value of the product above is positive in both cases. 
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              

   





We claim that 
() ( ) 1 ( )
LM f L M e
 
      is negative for all  0.    Indeed, 
 
( ) ( ) '( ) ( ) ( )(1 )
L M L M f L M L M e L M e
 
         
If  0    then  '( ) 0 f    while If  0    then  '( ) 0. f    Since  (0) '(0) 0 ff  , our claim 
follows. Since  ( ) ( ) Eu g f    multiplied by a positive value, the desired result follows. 
 




          Proposition 2.2  Let  g  be gambles that result in a gain M  with probability  p  and a loss 








































   
          Proof.  1. If  2 1 < p p  then  ) ( < ) (
2 1 x f x f p p  for all  >1, x  and 
12 ( ) ( ) pp f x f x   for all 
>1, x  where  ) (x f
i p  is the concave function defined in (11) with  . = i p p  Recall  () i Qg is the  
root of this function other than 1. If  0 i Eg   then  ( ) 1 i Qg   for  1,2 i  , hence we must have 
). ( > ) ( 2 1 g Q g Q   If  0 i Eg    then  ( ) 1 i Qg  for  1,2 i  ,  hence  again  ). ( > ) ( 2 1 g Q g Q   If 
12 <0 Eg Eg   then  1 ( ) >1 Qg while  2 ( ) 1. Qg   











       
     
          3. Assume  12 . MM   Let  1 g  be the gamble resulting in  1 M and  2 g  resulting in  2. M  
Let )). ( ( ln = 1 1 g Q    By (6),  1   is the upper limit of taking  1 g  and  0. = ) ( 1 1 g Eu  If  0 < Eg  
then  0 < 1   by Cor.1.11.2, so by Prop. 2.1.2,  12 11 0 ( ) ( ). Eu g Eu g    Hence  1   accepts  . 2 g  
This implies by Cor.1.11.2 again that  , < 2 1    where  0 < 2   is the upper limit of taking  . 2 g  
Hence  12 ( ) ( ) Q g Q g   and we are done. When  0 > Eg  then by Cor.1.11.1  1 0,   and by Prop. 
2.1.2,  12 11 0 ( ) ( ). Eu g Eu g  
 
Hence  1   rejects  2 g  and thus  21 <   and  12 ( ) ( ). Q g Q g   
If  0 = Eg then by Cor.1.12.2, Q(g) = 1 and the result follows.  QED 
 




    Corollary  2.3 
( ) ( )
< 0 if > 0 and > 0 if < 0.
( ) ( )
Eu g Eu g
Eg Eg




  This 
follows since   ( ) ( )
=.
( ) ( )
Eu g Eu g M





                
               Since increasing M is the same as increasing the Variance and the Standard Deviation of 
g, we could restate Prop. 2.2.3 as follows: Set  , where  R
Eg









             
              One could ask whether the above hold for any gamble. The answer is negative as will be 
demonstrated in the following counter examples. Recall that R violates monotonicity with respect 
to first order dominance, as shown in [AS, 7.2], while Q does not. Nevertheless, in the next 
section we show that for the empirical results this is true “on average”. This justifies the use of R 
as a measure of risk (It is the reciprocal of the Sharpe Ratio
6).  
             
             Example 2.4   The following two tables are examples of gambles g with fixed Eg, where 
the last two columns demonstrate how even though Q increases, E(g
2) and thus Var(g) and R, 
neither decrease nor increase.   
            Assume first that g results in {-3,-2, 0, 1, 2} with probabilities {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5} 
respectively. We have:  
 
p1  p2  p3  p4  p5  Eg  E(g
2)  Q 
0.05  0.15  0.20  0.35  0.25  0.4  2.4  0.727857 
0.00  0.30  0.00  0.40  0.30  0.4  2.8  0.753716 
0.10  0.10  0.10  0.50  0.20  0.4  2.6  0.753805 
 
            Even if we fix the p’s and change the M’s, we do not see unambiguous relations. Assume 
g results in {M1, M2, M3, M4, M5} with corresponding fixed probabilities {0.1, 0.3, 0.2, 0.25, 
0,15}. Then we have:  
    
                                        
6
 See Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2002) and Welch (2005).   
18 
 
M1  M2  M3  M4  M5  Eg  E(g
2)  Q 
-1.00  -1.00  0.00  1.00  3.67  0.4  2. 67  0.667933 
-2.00  -1.00  2.00  1.10  1.50  0.4  2.14  0.675817 
-2.00  -1.00  1.00  1.00  3.00  0.4  2.5  0.698304 
    
 
  3   Applications  
 
             In this section we present three examples of possible applications of our index in order of 
increasing complexity. We begin with a case of a binary gamble, where all probabilities and 
payouts are known: roulette. In this simple case, all investors are risk lovers, since expected 
returns are uniformly negative.  
            Next, we consider a more complex example of a binary bet: horse race betting.  Here 
payouts  are  more-or-less  known,  depending  upon  whether  the  betting  is  via  pari-mutuel  or 
bookmakers, but the probabilities of different outcomes must be estimated. The inherent riskiness 
of different horse bets are calculated using estimates of horses' winning probabilities derived from 
data drawn from the Happy Valley horse betting market in Hong Kong. 
            Finally, we move on to a case in which neither probabilities nor returns are known with 
certainty and the gambles are no longer binary: the Wall Street stock options market. Using a 
simple example, we estimate probabilities and payouts and calculate the inherent risk index of a 
large range of option bets. Both here and in the case of the horse betting market, we use our 
calculated indexes to test hypotheses derived in the previous section. 
 
Application 3.1: 
           We begin with the simplest practical example of the inherent risk index, the casino game 
of roulette. In this case, every possible bet is a binary gamble where the return to a losing bet is 
always the outlay and both the probability of success and the concomitant payout are known. 
There is thus no uncertainty here, merely risk.  Table I provides complete details for the different 
kinds of bets available in the American version of the game
7.  
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Table I: The Inherent Risk Index (Q) For American Roulette  
 
Bet 






(on a $1 
bet) = Eg 
Q(g) 
-ln(Q) = upper 
limit of taking 
g 
0  0  35 to 1  37 to 1  −$0.053  1.003065  -0.00306 
00  00  35 to 1  37 to 1  −$0.053  1.003065  -0.00306 
Straight 
up  Any single number  35 to 1  37 to 1  −$0.053  1.003065  -0.00306 
Row 00  0, 00  17 to 1  18 to 1  −$0.053  1.006318  -0.0063 
Split  any two adjoining numbers 
vertical or horizontal  17 to 1  18 to 1  −$0.053  1.006318  -0.0063 
Trio  0, 1, 2 or 00, 2, 3  11 to 1  11.667 to 1  −$0.053  1.00978  -0.00973 
Street  any three numbers horizontal  11 to 1  11.667 to 1  −$0.053  1.00978  -0.00973 
Corner  any four adjoining numbers 
in a block  8 to 1  8.5 to 1  −$0.053  1.013457  -0.01337 
Six Line  any six numbers from two 
horizontal rows  5 to 1  5.33 to 1  −$0.053  1.02138  -0.02116 
1st 
Column 
1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22, 25, 
28, 31, 34  2 to 1  2.167 to 1  −$0.053  1.05467  -0.05323 
2nd 
Column 
2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 
29, 32, 35  2 to 1  2.167 to 1  −$0.053  1.05467  -0.05323 
3rd 
Column 
3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27, 
30, 33, 36  2 to 1  2.167 to 1  −$0.053  1.05467  -0.05323 
1st Dozen  1 through 12  2 to 1  2.167 to 1  −$0.053  1.05467  -0.05323 
2nd 
Dozen  13 through 24  2 to 1  2.167 to 1  −$0.053  1.05467  -0.05323 
3rd 
Dozen  25 through 36  2 to 1  2.167 to 1  −$0.053  1.05467  -0.05323 
Odd  1, 3, 5, ..., 35  1 to 1  1.111 to 1  −$0.053  1.111  -0.02116 
Even  2, 4, 6, ..., 36  1 to 1  1.111 to 1  −$0.053  1.111  -0.02116 
Red 
1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 18, 
19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 30, 32, 34, 
36 
1 to 1  1.111 to 1  −$0.053  1.111  -0.02116 
Black 
2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 
13, 15, 17, 20, 22, 24, 
26, 28, 29, 31, 33, 35 
1 to 1  1.111 to 1  −$0.053  1.111  -0.02116 
1 to 18  1, 2, 3, ..., 18  1 to 1  1.111 to 1  −$0.053  1.111  -0.02116 
19 to 36  19, 20, 21, ..., 36  1 to 1  1.111 to 1  −$0.053  1.111  -0.05323 
Five 
Number  0, 00, 1, 2, 3  6 to 1  6.6 to 1  −$0.079  1.027295  -0.02693 
 
The initial bet is returned in addition to the mentioned payout. Note also that 0 and 00 are neither odd nor 






1. We have by Prop. 2.2.3, that
()







. This is demonstrated in the table (except 
for the "Five Number Bet", which has a different expectation). 
 
2. There are risk loving gamblers that will not take "higher risk" gambles, but will take "lower 
risk" ones. Here "higher" and "lower" are with respect to the table only, and NOT immediately 
intuitive. If their utility function has a coefficient of absolute risk aversion ʱ, and  -0.05323 < ʱ < 
-0.00306 then they will never take the 1-1 gamble, but can take the 1-35 gamble. This follows 
since the 1-1 gamble has its upper limit -0.05323, and by Cor.1.11 gamblers with higher ʱ never 
take it.  It is riskier in this sense.  
 
3. An intuitive explanation to higher and lower values of riskiness for negative expectation could 
be the following. Gamblers who put money on gambles with negative expectations are all risk 
lovers, which means that they get thrills from higher values of money. Thus to love risk means to 
love thrills. Such a gambler risks losing more utility by taking 2 to 1 bets, because he gets fewer 
thrills.  
 
4. If a gambler has a utility function with a coefficient of absolute risk aversion ʱ, and ʱ < -
0.05323, then he can take any of the gambles. This DOES NOT IMPLY that he will bet on the 
higher or on the lower risk gamble. This can vary for different values of ʱ. For example:  If         
ʱ =-0.01 then he will bet on one of the following three gambles, 35 to 1, 17 to 1 or 11 to 1. 
 
5. Based upon these observations, we would predict that more roulette players choose to play 35 
to 1 gambles and fewest would chooses even money gambles. Unfortunately, we have no data 
that would permit us to test this hypothesis formally, but we have been told that the following 
holds in casinos operated by HIT in Slovenia and elsewhere in Southern Europe.
8 First, less than 
5 percent of all gamblers play 2 to 1 or even money gambles. Second, in most instances there are 
multiple bets on one spin of the wheel.  Thus, most of the  gamblers choose 17 to 1 or 35 to 1 
gambles, but most of the customers will cover, with such bets, approximately 12 of the available 
numbers (out of 37) on one roulette spin. Finally, following winning bets, gamblers will proceed 
to cover more numbers in a subsequent bet. There is no observable trend following losing bets. 
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Application 3.2:   
          As a second application of the inherent risk index, consider the Hong Kong horse betting 
market at the Happy Valley racetrack. Using data on 16068 horses who ran at Happy Valley 
between September 2000 and October 2006, we ran the following conditional logit regression 
(Mc. Fadden 1974) to predict winning probabilities as a function of the following variables, all of 
which would be known prior to the particular race and which might be considered as relevant to a 
horse's performance: the horse's age, the weight it is to carry in the race, its starting barrier 
position, its opening and starting odds and the odds five minutes before the start of the race at its 
last start, the distance of its last race, the margin by which it lost its last race (zero if it won), its 
barrier draw, weight and finishing position at its last start, the change in class from this race to its 
last race and the winning strike rate of the horse's jockey in the sample.               
 This regression was then used to predict the winning probability of the each horse in the 
sample. The approximate tote odds 5 minutes before the race (and thus also known to bettors 
before the race) were used to calculate an estimate of the expected return for each horse. Given 
the loss of observations entailed by the use of lagged variables in the above regression, we were 
left with 7522 horses with negative expected returns and 7522 with positive expected returns. 
Note that, unlike the roulette case, where the index of inherent risk for all bets is known with 
certainty, in horse betting, there is uncertainty regarding the calculated Q for two reasons: (a) The 
true winning probabilities of the horses are unknown and are thus estimated with error. (b) The 
final payouts (and thus M) are unknown before the race is run and thus bettors must use estimates 
provided by the track. Uncertainty notwithstanding, we proceeded to test three hypotheses from 
Proposition 2.2:  
1. ∂Q(g)/∂Eg < 0. 


















The results are shown in Table II.  
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N  5422  7522 
2   Adjusted R   0.4801  0.1459 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. M is the profit per unit bet on a winning horse and Eg is the estimated expected return to a 
bet on the horse. These regressions were also run with horse fixed effects, but the latter were statistically significant only in the case of  
Eg < 0 and the coefficients of M and Eg and the intercept were virtually identical in size and significance to those shown in the table.
9 




             Note that, as expected, in the case of both regressions, the greater is Eg, the lower 
will be Q.  Thus, our perhaps counterintuitive results hold here for both horses with positive and 
negative expected returns: risk averse bettors, who only bet when expectations are positive are 
inclined to bet on favorites rather than longshots (inherent risk rises as M rises), while for risk 
lovers we see that inherent risk falls as M rises, suggesting that risk lovers will prefer to bet on 
longshots. It should be noted that the division of data set according to the sign of Eg does not 
provide us with populations of exclusively risk averse and risk loving bettors, since risk lovers 
will also bet on horses for which Eg>0. However, to that extent that our estimates of Eg are at 
least reasonable, all the bettor in the sub-sample for which Eg<0 will be risk lovers.  
 
Application 3.3: Finally, we present an example from the stock exchange and consider 
the gambles provided by options. In example 2.4 above, we showed that, given expected return, 
for non-binary gambles, an increase in inherent risk does not necessarily imply either an increase 
or a decrease in the variance of a gamble. Our purpose here is to show that, this mathematical 







. Our data set comprises all the call and put options traded on all financial stocks traded 
                                        
9 Full results are available upon request.  
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on Wall Street between the first trading day of 2005 and the last day of May, 2007.
10 After 
removal of observations with missing data and accommodation of the data set to the investment 
strategy described below, we were left with 508,284 observations.  While in the example of the 
horse betting, L and M were more or less known (and would be known in a bookmakers' market), 
it remained to estimate p as the betting market may be ch aracterized as a series of binary bets. 
Thus, there was an added complication that did not exist in the roulette example, where the index 
of inherent risk could be calculated accurately. Moving to options, none of the components of a 
gamble are known a priori with certainty and all must be estimated and the gambles are no longer 
binary.  
Since our purpose here is to provide a simple demonstration of the way in which the 
index of inherent risk is related the more usual measure of risk in finance, variance, we conducted 
the following mental experiment: An investor wishes to buy an option, hold it for 21 days  and 
then sell it. Since we are unable to predict winning options in advance, we calculated the  ex post 
rate of return that accrued to each such investment in the data set. The options were then ranked 
by rate of return and the sample was divided into ten more or less equal-sized groups (subject to 
the constraint that all investments in any group yielded either exclusively positive or exclusively 
negative returns. This yielded three groups with positive returns and seven with negative returns. 
The ten means of the returns were used as the returns to the gamble thus generated.  
Two multinomial logit regressions (one for call options and one for puts) were then run to 
predict the probabilities that the returns to investing in one of the options would fall into each of 
the profit groups. The explanatory variables used in the regression were the closing price of the 
underlying stock, the implicit volatility of the option relative the mean over the relevant industry 
group, the volumes traded in both the stocks and options, the spread of the option price relative to 
the  best  bid  and  the  gamma,  delta,  vega  and  theta  of  the  option.  These  variables  were  all 
statistically significant at better than 1 percent for all profit groups except volume of stock traded, 
which for statistically significant at 5 percent in at least one group.
11  
Having thus estimated the various components of the gamble, we proceeded to calculate 




" and "outness", and fixed effects for the 




is the ratio of the standard error of the specific option to 
its expected return, being a measure of the riskiness of the option in standard finance terms 
                                        
10 The data were provided by OptionMetrics.  
11 Full details available upon request.   
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corrected  for  the  expected  return.  This  means  that  the  variable  is  positive  for  gambles  with 
positive expected returns and we would expect a positive coefficient if volatility and inherent risk 






 for gambles that would be taken by risk lovers only and 
we would thus predict a positive coefficient again. However, for negative expected returns, the 
coefficient indicated that inherent riskiness falls with a rise in volatility. 
The second variable, outness, is the ratio of strike price to closing price of the underlying 
and thus measures, as the name suggests, the extent to which the option is out-of-the-money. 
Given that the standard error of the option has been taken into account, we would expect the 
coefficient of outness to be negative, since the odds payable to a successful bet for a given outlay 
on an option increase as outness increases. With volatility accounted for, increased outness will 
be less inherently risky for both risk lovers and the risk averse. The results are given in Table 3 
and the conform to our a priori expectations. 
 
         
 
 













































N  191241  97531  15977  202515 
2   Adjusted R   0.7294  0.4488  0.4002  0.5709 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include option fixed effects. SE/Eg is the ratio of standard error to expected 
yield divided by one million. Outness is defined as the ratio of the underlying stock closing price to the option strike price for a put 
option and the ratio of the option strike price to the underlying stock closing price. All coefficients are statistically significant at better 
than the 0.1% level. 
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